| Date issued: 06/07/2011 | |
| Editor: Betsy Stupski |  |
Clicking the icon following the number of each case cited below will link you directly to the cited opinion. AG Advisory Opinions are accessible from the list of links.
Appellate Alert 2011-10
June 7, 2011
United States Supreme Court
Fox v. Vice 10-114
6/6/11
When a defendant is defending both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, he may recover only those fees incurred but for the frivolous claims.
Fox, a candidate for police chief, sued Vice, the incumbent chief, for interfering with his right to seek public office. Fox included a number of state and federal claims. Vice removed the case to federal court on the basis of the section 1983 claims. Finding that the federal claims were frivolous, the federal court dismissed the federal claims and remanded the state claims back to federal court. The court went on to award Vice for his attorneys fees in defending all the claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The United States Supreme reversed and remanded. The Court determined that only the fees incurred but for the frivolous claims would be allowed. Any fees resulting from time connected to defending non-frivolous claims would not be granted.
10-114 10-114Fox.pdf
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Estate of McCall v. United States 09-16375
5/27/11
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the Florida statutory cap on noneconomic medical malpractice damages did not violate the United States Constitution but certified several questions to the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether the cap violated the Florida Constitution.
A woman had severe complications after a difficult birth. She ultimately suffered cardiac arrest and later was removed from life support. Her representatives sued for medical malpractice. The district court determined that the case was subject to Florida’s statutory cap on noneconomic medical malpractice damages.
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the cap on noneconomic damages violated both the Florida and United States Constitutions. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the statutory cap did not violate the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution because the Florida legislature had identified a legitimate governmental purpose. The Eleventh Circuit also concluded that the statutory cap did not violate the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. However, the Court went on to certify several questions to the Florida Supreme Court for a determination whether the statutory cap violated the Florida Constitution. The following questions were certified:
(1) Does the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, Fla. Stat. § 766.118, violate the right to equal protection under Article I, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution?
(2) Does the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, Fla. Stat. § 766.118, violate the right of access to the courts under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution?
(3) Does the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, Fla. Stat. § 766.118, violate the right to trial by jury under Article I, Section 22 of the Florida Constitution?
(4) Does the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, Fla. Stat. § 766.118, violate the separation of powers guaranteed by Article II, Section 3 and Article V, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution?
 11circv McCall v USA.pdf
Florida Supreme Court
Wald v. Grainger SC08-1143
5/19/11
Jury may reject expert testimony but must have some basis for rejecting it.
Wald suffered injuries as a result of a car accident. . The other driver involved in the accident admitted fault so the issues in the litigation were limited to causation and permanency of the injuries. Both the treating physician and the defendant’s expert opined that at least some of the injuries qualified as permanent. The judge then directed a verdict as to the permanency of those injuries. The Defendant objected arguing that the issue of permanency was an issue for the jury. The Defendant also argued that the directed verdict was inappropriate because the jury would have been free to reject the uncontradicted expert testimony. Ultimately the jury awarded one million dollars to the Plaintiff. The First District reversed the trial court, explaining that a jury is free to weigh the credibility of an expert witness as it would any other witness.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the First District. The Court said, “. However, … the jury’s ability to reject the testimony must be based on some reasonable basis in the evidence. This can include conflicting medical evidence, evidence that impeaches the expert’s testimony or calls it into question, such as the failure of the plaintiff to give the medical expert an accurate or complete medical history, conflicting lay testimony or evidence that disputes the injury claim, or the plaintiff’s conflicting testimony or self-contradictory statements regarding the injury. For example, when a medical expert’s opinion is predicated on an incomplete or inaccurate medical history, the jury is free to reject the expert medical testimony, even without conflicting medical testimony, if there is conflicting lay testimony.”
SC08-1143 FSCcv Wald v Grainger.doc
Third District Court of Appeal
Maynoldi v. Archbishop Coleman F. Carroll High School 3D08-3117
5/25/11
Although in some cases, parties may be entitled to attorney’s fees when they prove certain facts after the opposing party has denied a request for admission, the court has wide discretion in determining when fees are appropriate.
Archbishop Coleman F. Carroll High School denied certain requests for admission. Later when the Maynoldis were able to establish the facts surrounding the request for admission, they submitted a motion for attorney fees. The trial court denied the motion.
The Third District affirmed the trial court saying, “While, under appropriate circumstances, a party requesting admissions is entitled to the reasonable expenses incurred in proving the truth of a denied request for admission—even where, as here, final judgment was entered in the opposing party’s favor on the underlying complaint—we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that there is no basis for awarding Rule 1.380(c) expenses in this case.”
3D08-3117 3dcacv Maynoldi v Coleman.doc
Fifth District Court of Appeal
Jordan v. St. Johns County 5D09-2183
5/20/11
The County did not have absolute discretion to let county road fall into disrepair.
A road known locally as “Old AIA” fell into disrepair. Property owners who used the road as the only access to their neighborhood sued St Johns County for failing to repair the road. The County in turn argued that it had absolute discretion on when and how the road was to be repaired. The trial court issued a summary judgment in favor of the County.
The Fifth District partially reversed the summary judgment stating, “We hold that the County has a duty to reasonably maintain Old A1A as long as it is a public road dedicated to the public use. We do not hold that the County has the duty to maintain the road in a particular manner or at a particular level of accessibility. However, the County's discretion is not absolute. The County must provide a reasonable level of maintenance that affords meaningful access, unless or until the County formally abandons the road. The summary judgment was premature because disputed issues of material fact remain regarding the level of road maintenance the County has provided and the level of maintenance it should have provided.”
5D09-2183 5dcacv Jordan v St Johns Cty.doc
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