| Date issued: 10/11/2011 | |
| Editor: Betsy Stupski |  |
Clicking the icon following the number of each case cited below will link you directly to the cited opinion. AG Advisory Opinions are accessible from the list of links.
Appellate Alert 2011-15
October 11, 2011
Florida Supreme Court Lewis v. Leon County SC09-1698
9/22/2011
Section 19 of Chapter 2007-62, Laws of Florida was held unconstitutional because it impermissibly shifted constitutionally defined costs from the state to the counties.
The Legislature enacted chapter 2007-62 which created the Offices of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel (RCC), a system of court appointed counsel to represent indigent defendants, primarily in those cases where the public defender has a conflict of interest. Part of the act (section 19) required counties to pay to house the RCC. The First District held that that section 19 of chapter 2007-62, Laws of Florida was unconstitutional because it impermissibly shifted constitutionally defined costs from the state to the counties.
Finding that the state constitution clearly laid out the responsibility of the state to pay certain costs, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed saying, “In the instant case, the First District Court and the Leon County Circuit Court concluded that the plain language of article V, section 14 provides that the state is responsible for funding the RCC, including the overhead costs outlined in subsection (c)… We agree.”
SC09-1698 FSCcv Lewis v Leon County.doc
Second District Court of Appeal
Laser Spine Institute v. Makanast 2D11-697
9/21/11
Trial court should have entered an order, either by agreement of parties or by its own initiative, protecting confidentiality before requiring party to produce trade secrets.
The trial court granted a motion requiring Laser Spine Institute (LSI) to produce documents relating to their billing and collection practices. LSI petitioned for review, arguing that the documents were trade secrets.
After noting that that was no credible argument that the documents were not trade secrets, the Second District still found that the documents were subject to disclosure. However the Court found that the trial court should have entered a protective order that ensured the confidentiality of the documents. The Court went on to say that if the parties could not negotiate a confidentiality agreement then the trial was to enter a narrowly tailored order protecting LSI’s trade secrets.
2D11-697 2dcacv Laser Spine v Makanast.doc
Third District Court of Appeal
Stand Up for Animals, Inc. v. Monroe County 3D11-316
9/14/11
Monroe County entered into a contract with Stand Up for Animals, Inc. (SUFA) in which SUFA was to provide animal control services. During a formal audit Monroe discovered among other things that SUFA was charging more for the services than allowed by the contract. The County then sought an injunction and asked the Court to freeze bank accounts belonging to SUFA. The trial court granted the injunction freezing the bank accounts and denied SUFA’s motion to dissolve the injunction. SUFA appealed.
The Third District determined that the pre-judgment asset-freeze was impermissible because the County had an adequate remedy at law. The Court said, “It is well established that a prejudgment temporary injunction must be supported by evidence of ‘[a] clear legal right or interest in the subject matter of the suit, the likelihood of irreparable harm because of the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, and a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.’” The Court went on to say, “Because the allegations assert no more than a breach of contract compensable by a damage award, no irreparable harm essential to secure injunctive relief freezing SUFA’s bank accounts could be demonstrated.”
3D11-316 3dcacv Stand Up v Monroe.doc Fourth District Court of Appeal
Jupiter Medical Center, Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Association of Florida, Inc 4D10-1803
9/14/11
When the legality of a contract is at issue, a trial court must address that issue before enforcing an arbitral award.
The parties entered in to a contract where Visiting Nurse Association of Florida bought the home healthcare division of Jupiter Medical Center. The contract included a broad arbitration provision. At some point after the contract was signed, Visiting Nurse Association of Florida (VNA) became dissatisfied and filed an arbitration claim for breach of contract. An arbitration panel found that Jupiter Medical Center (JMC) breached the contract. Eventually JMC filed a motion to vacate the arbitration panel’s decision in Florida circuit court, arguing that the contract violated federal and state law. VNA responded with a motion to dismiss. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the arbitration award for VNA.
The issue before the Fourth District was whether the trial court should have considered whether or not the contract was legal before enforcing the arbitral award. Reversing the trial court, the Fourth District said, “When the issue of legality is raised, the trial court must make that determination prior to deciding whether to enforce the arbitral award based thereon.”
4D10-1803 4dcacv Jupiter Medical v Visiting .doc
Fidelity Warranty Services, Inc. v. Firstate Insurance Holdings, Inc. 4D09-2411
10/5/11
Since the business owner’s testimony regarding the value of his business went beyond lay testimony when he testified that he had expertise and special knowledge of the industry, the court should not have admitted the testimony because no proper foundation was laid for expert testimony.
Parties entered into a complex commercial arrangement. After the business relationship failed, Firstate and its principal owner claimed damages for the destruction of the business. A jury awarded Firstate almost seven million in damages for tortious interference and defamation.
The question on appeal was whether the trial court should have allowed Charles Eldridge, the owner of Firstate, to testify about the market value of Firstate. The Fourth District first acknowledged that an owner can testify as to the value of his business. However the court still found error in allowing the testimony saying, “The error in the trial court’s analysis was that Eldridge’s testimony was more than just that of an “owner” testifying to the value of his property…Here, Eldridge’s testimony turned into “expert” testimony when he claimed to have specialized knowledge regarding the proper mathematical formula which should be used to calculate the market value of a niche insurance agency in Puerto Rico. He further testified that he acquired this knowledge through thirty years’ experience as an agent in the insurance industry and that he had bought and sold insurance agencies more than ten times in the past using the same valuation methodology…Thus, Mr. Eldridge was testifying not to just having knowledge of the value of his own property, but also to having specialized knowledge of the insurance agency market in Puerto Rico acquired through his experience in the industry. This is the very essence of expert testimony.”
4D09-2411 4dcacv Fidelity Warranty v. Firstate Insurance.doc
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