Office of Attorney General Pam Bondi
Criminal Law Alert
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Date issued: 05/24/2012
Editor: Carolyn Snurkowski
Clicking the icon following the number of each case cited below will link you directly to the cited opinion. In addition, full texts of recent slip opinions are available by clicking "VIEW" at the top of your screen, then "SLIP OPINIONS." AGOs are available in the separate AGO database.
United States Supreme Court
Certiorari Granted:
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
Docket No.: 11-1025
Issue: Whether respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief because they proffered no evidence that the United States would imminently acquire their international communications using 50 U.S.C. 1881a-authorized surveillance and did not show that an injunction prohibiting Section 1881a-authorized surveillance would likely redress their purported injuries.
Certiorari Denied:
Pickering v. Colorado
Docket No.: 11-870
Disclaimer: Goldstein & Russell, P.C. serves as counsel to the petitioner this case.
Issue: When the accused in a criminal case properly raises a defense that negates an element of the charged crime, does the Due Process Clause require the prosecution to disprove that defense?
“Petitions to Watch.” Summaries by Matthew Bush @ SCOTUS.
The following are some of the cases are up for consideration at the Justices’ private conference on May 24, 2012.
Daman v. Brooks
Docket: 11-898
Issue(s): (1) Whether – when officers applied a Taser to the plaintiff, who was under arrest and resisting officers’ efforts to remove her from her car – the Ninth Circuit erred in finding the Taser use unconstitutional where (a) it was the least risky pain compliance option available, and (b) the decision is in conflict with Graham v. Connor’s holding that an arrest necessarily carries with it the authority to use some degree of force; (2) whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the plaintiff stated a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim despite declaring that the record was insufficient to assess the level of force presented by the drive-stun Taser, particularly where the court failed to address whether any less-risky alternatives were available to the officers; (3) whether the Ninth Circuit should have found the use of the Taser constitutional as a matter of law where the officers chose the least risky force option, the result reached by the original Ninth Circuit panel; and (4) whether the Ninth Circuit’s opinion conflicts with other circuits’ decisions on Taser pain compliance applications in similar circumstances.
Brooks v. Daman
Docket: 11-1045
Issue(s): Whether any reasonable official would have understood that it was excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment for police officers to deploy a Taser, three times over the course of less than one minute, against a woman who was seven months pregnant, simply because the woman refused to exit her vehicle during a routine traffic stop?
Agarano v. Mattos
Docket: 11-1032
Issue(s): Whether the officers’ use of a Taser on Jayzel Mattos was excessive force under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?
Mattos v. Agarano
Docket: 11-1165
Issue(s): (1) Whether a reasonable official would have understood that it was excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to rush into a situation with other officers present and deploy a Taser against a suspect in her own home who was not a potential threat to the officers or the public, who was not actively resisting arrest, and was simply attempting to calm a heated situation and comply with another officer’s instructions to speak outside of her house; and (2) whether summary judgment was properly denied in an excessive force case where genuine issues of disputed fact existed as to whether the use of the Taser on Jayzel Mattos was reasonable.
Bright v. Holder
Docket: 11-890
Issue(s): (1) Whether a noncitizen who fails to respond to an agency order to report for removal is a “fugitive” for purposes of applying the “fugitive disentitlement” doctrine where the petitioner has not absconded and his address is known to the court and the government; (2) whether a petitioner is a “fugitive” for purposes of applying the “fugitive disentitlement” doctrine even if he has been detained and is in government custody; and (3) whether the doctrine is a per se jurisdictional bar to appellate review, or merely authorizes a court to exercise its discretion and weigh the equities in a particular case.
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The following petitions have been re-listed for the conference of May 24.
Coleman v. Johnson
Docket: 11-1053
Issue(s): (1) Whether the court of appeals’ grant of habeas relief based on a finding that the Pennsylvania courts misapplied Pennsylvania law should be reversed given that it conflicts with this Court’s holdings that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to examine state court application of state law and that only noncompliance with clearly-established federal law will render a state’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in federal court; (2) whether the court of appeals’ refusal to credit factual inferences favorable to the prosecution in connection with its Jackson v. Virginia analysis due to its subjective view that those inferences do not “more likely than not flow from” the trial evidence should be reversed given that it conflicts with this Court's holdings that a federal habeas court conducting a Jackson review must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, presume that the jury resolved any conflicting factual inferences in favor of the prosecution, and defer to that resolution; (3) whether the court of appeals’ determination, which patently relies upon its own subjective conclusions regarding witness credibility and the proper weight to be accorded the record evidence, should be reversed given that it contravenes this Court’s repeated admonitions that a federal habeas court conducting a Jackson review is strictly forbidden from substituting its judgment for that of the jury on weight and credibility issues; (4) whether the court of appeals’ determination, which relies upon a definition of accomplice liability that conflicts with Pennsylvania law, should be reversed given this Court’s holdings that a federal habeas court engaged in a Jackson analysis must apply the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law; and (5) whether the court of appeals’ de facto finding that the state courts’ conviction was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented should be reversed given that it fails to acknowledge or address the presumption of correctness that must be afforded the factual inferences drawn by the state courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(l) and therefore conflicts with this Court’s holdings that the presumption of correctness afforded state court factual findings cannot be overridden absent clear and convincing contrary evidence.
Howes v. Walker
Docket: 11-1011
Issue(s): (1) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)’s invitation to decide the reasonableness of a state-court factual determination fits with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)’s command that an underlying state-court fact determination must be presumed correct; (2) whether the Sixth Circuit violated Section 2254(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) by granting habeas relief on a purportedly unreasonable application of state law; and (3) whether the Sixth Circuit violated AEDPA § 2254(d)(1) by asserting its own prejudice standard – that a defendant “must only show that he had a substantial defense” – rather than this Court’s clearly established law as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, that prejudice requires a showing that, but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
United States Court of Appeal
Eleventh Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
“District Court improperly afforded virtually no deference to the Florida Supreme Court’s reliance on the considerable body of evidence mounted against Mansfield.”
Mansfield v. Secretary, DOC, et al., 09-12312. Decided May 9, 2012.
The State of Florida appealed the district court’s order granting habeas relief to Mansfield on his claim “that the admission at trial of a videotape of his custodial interrogation by the law enforcement officers, when he never received any Miranda warnings, yielded prejudicial constitutional error.” The Florida Supreme Court, on direct appeal, found the admission was error, but was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States District Court (Middle District) granted habeas relief on Mansfield’s claim that “the erroneous admission of the videotaped interrogation in violation of Miranda was not harmless” and denied relief on his other fourteen claims. The district court determined “that the Florida Supreme Court’s harmless error determination was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and that the admission of the videotape has a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.” The State appealed the order granting habeas relief as to Claim One arguing the district court “wrongfully substituted its own independent factfinding about the nature and strength of the State’s evidence against Mansfield for the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.”
The 11th Circuit noted there is no dispute that the admission of the videotaped interrogation was in error and “the sole question we face is whether that error was harmless.” The 11th Circuit discussed at length the AEDPA/Chapman standard and the Brecht standard for evaluating harmless error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
The 11th Circuit stated that “the corpus of evidence again Mansfield was substantial” and that “the jury was presented with considerable evidence of Mansfield’s presence at the crime scene with Robles almost exactly contemporaneous to the killing.” The “principal substantive information revealed by the video tape . . . could not have been prejudicial because it was already well-established and fully corroborated by other evidence.” The “properly admitted evidence against Mansfield was substantial and far more probative than the erroneously admitted interrogation.”
The 11th Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting habeas relief.
- As we see it, the district court essentially engaged in its own factfinding process, failing to accept as correct (as it was obliged to do) some of the unrebutted factual findings of the Florida Supreme Court that credited significant pieces of the State’s case against Mansfield. The district court also afforded precious little weight to other pieces of evidence that the Florida Supreme Court fairly relied upon, and ignored entirely still other evidence incriminating Mansfield. Viewing the entirety of the evidence in light of the full record and according proper deference to the Florida Supreme Court’s factfinding process, we are constrained to conclude that the admission of the videotaped interrogation amounted to harmless error under the “actual prejudice” standard for collateral review set forth by the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
[Mansfield v. Secretary, DOC, 05/09/12]
Opinion:
District court correctly dismissed all claims; there is no constitutional right to access evidence for DNA testing.
Alvarez v. AG State of FL, et al., 11-10699. Opinion filed May 8, 2012.
Alvarez, convicted of first-degree murder, sexual battery, and aggravated child abuse, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Alvarez petitioned the postconviction court for some of the physical evidence for DNA testing and was denied. The 5th DCA affirmed the denial. Alvarez claimed, in his federal complaint, that he was denied access “to physical evidence for purposes of DNA testing, in violation of his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and compulsory process, and his Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts.” “The district court dismissed all of the claims for failure to state a claim or for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
The 11th Circuit noted that “[t]he Supreme Court’s recent decision in Osborne controls the resolution of many of the issues raised on appeal.” Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009). “Osborne’s right to due process is not parallel to a trial right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the fact that he has already been found guilty at a fair trial, and has only a limited interest in postconviction relief.” Id. at 2320.
Following a lengthy review and analysis, the 11th Circuit affirmed.
- The Supreme Court has recently made it abundantly clear that there is no freestanding constitutional right to access evidence for DNA testing, and that the federal courts may only upset a state’s postconviction DNA access procedures if they are fundamentally inadequate to vindicate substantive rights. Alvarez has made no showing that Florida’s postconviction DNA access procedures are unconstitutional on their face. Indeed, at oral argument, Alvarez’s counsel explicitly abandoned any facial challenge to the constitutionality of Florida’s access procedures. Alvarez also attacks the state courts’ application of these procedures to the facts of his case, but the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. His remaining claims attempt in various ways to assert a freestanding constitutional right to obtain evidence for DNA testing; they are squarely foreclosed by case precedent.
Assistant Attorneys General Susan Maher and Christine Guard represented the state.
[Alvarez v. AG State of FL, et al., 05/08/12]
Opinion:
Florida Supreme Court
Defendant was not coerced into making the confession; defendant’s conversation with Jackson was not custodial for Miranda purposes.
Peterson v. State, SC10-274. Opinion filed May 17, 2012.
Peterson appeals his conviction and death sentence for the first-degree murder of his 64-year-old stepfather, Roy Andrews. On direct appeal, Peterson raised eight claims. In one of his guilt-phase issues, Peterson argued that “the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress the statement he made to Jackson because he had been coerced and he had not been given his Miranda warnings.”
The record revealed that the police suspected Peterson was involved in the murder of his stepfather. Jimmy Jackson, a friend of Peterson’s, was arrested for “running a stop sign while driving on a suspended license” a few days after the murder. While in custody, Jackson agreed to call Peterson and ask about the murder. Peterson made some incriminating statements during the phone call. During that phone call, Jackson set up a meeting with Peterson and the two agreed to when and where they would meet. The police wired Jackson for that meeting and Peterson “admitted to killing Andrews and provided numerous details about the crime, including that he killed Andrews in broad daylight at 9:45 in the morning.” Peterson discussed other details and “then described the murder in detail.” Peterson also discussed his former girlfriend, “who was buried in Greenlawn Cemetery, telling Jackson that Andrews ‘landed on her grave.’”
While Peterson asserted the trial court erred denying his initial suppression motion that he was coerced into making the confession, the Florida Supreme Court stated that “on appeal, Peterson does not make any argument on this ground. Thus, he has waived this argument.” Further, the Court determined that “there is no evidence to support the claim that Peterson felt coerced.”
In his second suppression motion, Peterson “alleged that he was in custody and was being interrogated since Jackson was an agent of the police, and thus he was entitled to Miranda warnings, which were not given at this stage.” The Court looked to Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004), to consider the “circumstances surrounding the interrogation” and “given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”
The Court found the trial court did not err and Peterson is not entitled to relief on this issue and denied both motions to suppress. The meeting between Peterson and Jackson is not in question. Per the conversation, Peterson was anxious to meet with Jackson because he wanted to get “the proceeds from a drug transaction” they worked on together. The two met in Jackson’s vehicle, at a public parking lot, in plain view. While Jackson asked questions of Peterson “the manner of their conversation does not show any type of pressure at all.” “Peterson clearly wanted to share the details . . .” “Jackson did not confront Peterson with any evidence of his guilt.” And Peterson was free to leave at any time. When he got out of the vehicle to have a cigarette, he did not ask permission and he returned to the vehicle when done.
The Court found the death sentence is proportionate and the evidence is sufficient to support Peterson’s first-degree murder conviction. The Court affirmed Peterson’s convictions and sentence of death.
Assistant Attorney General Meredith Charbula represented the state.
[Peterson v. State, 05/17/12]
Opinion:
IN RE: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases – Report No. 2011-03 (SC11-1313). Filed May 17, 2012.
The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases filed a report proposing amendments to five existing criminal instructions and proposing four new criminal instructions. The Committee also proposed amendments to criminal instructions for special proceedings, "i.e., the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators," which included revisions to two instructions and two new proposed instructions. The proposed instructions derived from recommendations "based upon changes in statutory and decisional law, and where no instruction existed for a particular criminal offense." Two of the committee's proposals were severed, as related issues were presently under review in other cases, and the Court rejected a proposed new standard jury instruction on resisting recovery of merchandise. The remaining proposals were authorized for publication and use.
Jury Instructions:
B.O.L.O. - - - B.O.L.O. - New Cases Review by Florida Supreme Court. Summary in The Florida Law Weekly, Volume 37, Number 19 & 20, May 11 & 17, 2012.
REVIEW GRANTED
Cases in which the Supreme Court of Florida has granted review. Subject matter is taken from Florida Law Weekly headnotes and may not directly reflect issues for review.
CMI, INC. v. ULLOA, 73 So. 3d 787, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2044a (Fla. 5DCA 2011). Supreme Court Case No. SC11-2291 (Ulloa v. CMI, Inc.). Order dated May 2, 2012. Oral argument will be set by separate order. Criminal law--Driving under influence--Circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity departed from essential requirements of law when it denied foreign corporation's petition for review of county court order denying motions to quash subpoenas seeking the production of the source code for software version used in Intoxilyzer 8000 breath testing instruments manufactured by the corporation--The only way to secure out-of-state witnesses or documents in a criminal case is to follow the procedures set forth in Uniform Law to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without the State in Criminal Proceedings--Uniform Law applies not only to out-of-state witnesses, but also to out-of-state corporations which possess documents material to a criminal case--Conflict certified--Appeals--Certiorari review is appropriate in this case, although the circuit court followed precedent from another district court of appeal, where holding of sister district court violated clearly established statutory law.
MATARRANZ v. STATE, __ So. 3d __, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1667a (Fla. 3DCA 2011). Supreme Court Case No. SC11-1617 (Matarranz v. State). Order dated May 2, 2012. Oral argument will be set by separate order. Criminal law--Jurors--Challenge for cause--Trial court did not commit manifest error in denying motion to strike for cause juror who initially stated that, because of a past experience, she would hold a grudge against people who violate the law, and that she may lean toward the state, where the totality of juror's responses demonstrated her ability to be fair and impartial and decide case based solely on evidence presented at trial.
STATE v. DUDLEY, 64 So. 3d 746, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1431b (Fla. 5DCA 2011). Supreme Court Case No. SC11-2292 (Dudley v. State). Order dated April 24, 2012. No oral argument. Criminal law--Sexual battery on mentally defective person--Evidence was sufficient to support finding that victim was a mentally defective person, and trial court erred in setting aside jury's verdicts of guilty and dismissing charges on ground that evidence was insufficient to support finding that victim was a mentally defective person--Conflict certified with decision in Mathis v. State, 682 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), to extent that Mathis can be read as equating "mental deficiency" with competence to testify, or to mean a total or complete lack of mental capacity or understanding--Court recedes from State v. Torresgrossa, 776 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), to the extent it positively relied on Mathis.
CAMPBELL v. STATE, 75 So. 3d 757, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2367b (Fla. 2DCA 2011). Supreme Court Case No. SC12-28 (Campbell v. State). Order dated May 15, 2012. No oral argument. Criminal law--Plea--Withdrawal--Post-sentencing motion--Trial court properly found that without a showing of manifest injustice or clear prejudice, defendant was not entitled to withdraw plea, after sentencing, based on trial court's alleged failure to formally accept plea during plea colloquy--Conflict certified.
First District Court of Appeal
Trial court erred denying motion for mistrial; “impermissible statements” cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Rose v. State, 1D11-346. Opinion filed May 22, 2012.
Rose, convicted and sentenced for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, appealed arguing “the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial based upon the prosecutor’s comments during its opening statement regarding Appellant’s refusal to consent to a search of his vehicle.” While Rose raised four issues, the 1st DCA only dealt with the above issue, “as it is dispositive.”
The record reveals that during opening statements “the State described the arresting officer’s initial encounter with Appellant” which included the officer’s conversation with Rose where the officer asked if he could search the vehicle and Rose said “No, I don’t want you to search my car. I’m going into the club now.” Rose had already gotten out of his vehicle and consented to a search of his person. Defense objected and moved for a mistrial “arguing it was a comment on Appellant’s invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent, and also that it was ‘a link in the chain of evidence.’” The trial court overruled the objection and instructed “the State to inform the jury of its error and advise them to disregard the comment.”
The 1st DCA found “the trial court erred by overruling Appellant’s objection and that this error was not harmless here.” See Bravo v. State, 65 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (reversing conviction where trial court allowed impermissible testimony regarding defendant’s refusal to consent to search of home without a warrant); Gomez v. State, 572 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding “[c]omment on a defendant's denial of permission to search a vehicle, although not exactly the same thing as comment on a defendant's right to remain silent, since the Fourth Amendment is involved rather than the Fifth, constitutes constitutional error of the same magnitude.”)
The 1st DCA noted that “Appellant’s entire defense was that he did not knowingly possess the firearm; the defense theory, based on the testimony of both Appellant and his grandmother, was that both the firearm and the car belonged to his grandmother, and he did not know the gun was in the car until he was being pursued by police on a traffic charge and he reached into the glove compartment to retrieve the vehicle’s registration.” The opening statement about Rose refusing the police to search his vehicle “went directly to the issue of knowing possession.” The 1st DCA stated that the prosecutors opening statements, along with the police officer’s testimony that he thought he saw a case containing a gun on the floorboard of the vehicle, is an “impermissible comment” that “could easily have led the jury to conclude that Appellant declined the vehicle search because he knew he had a gun in the car, which obviously negated his entire theory that he did not know his grandmother had mistakenly left her gun in the glove compartment.” The 1st DCA reversed and remanded for a new trial finding that “this error cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Assistant Attorney General Samuel Perrone represented the state.
[Rose v. State, 05/22/12]
Opinion:
Second District Court of Appeal
Trial court erred admitting Williams rule evidence.
Rogers v. State, 2D10-2202. Opinion filed May 11, 2012.
Rogers, convicted and sentenced for attempted robbery with a firearm, appealed his conviction and sentence arguing the “trial court erred in admitting Williams rule evidence.” See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
The record shows that Rogers was originally charged with first-degree felony murder and two counts of robbery. It was alleged that Rogers and Timothy Brooks robbed Jakob Cunnien and William White and that Brooks fatally shot White. At Roger’s trial, “the court allowed the State to present testimony that Mr. Rogers committed a robbery one week before this shooting.” Roger’s was acquitted of felony murder and one count of robbery. He was found guilty of the lesser offense, attempted robbery with a firearm and sentenced to fifteen years in prison with a ten-year mandatory minimum for using a firearm. There were witnesses that testified they saw the shooting and gave their versions of events that lead up to the fatal shooting of White. Over defense objection, the State wanted to bring into evidence that Rogers committed a robbery with Peterson and Brooks one week before the shooting. The State proffered the testimony of Mr. Peterson, who “admitted that he wanted to be a cooperating State witness to avoid drug and homicide charges” and the trial court allowed the testimony into evidence.
The trial court made the determination, before allowing the State to present Williams rule evidence to the jury: “(1) that there was clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Rogers committed the uncharged crime, (2) that the uncharged crime was similar enough to be relevant, (3) that the uncharged crime was not so temporally remote as to diminish its relevance, and (4) that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value.” See Carbonell v. State, 47 So. 3d 944, 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). “With specific reference to similarity, the trial court found that both robberies involved guns, drugs, and the order to ‘give it up.’" The trial court found the offenses probative of Rogers’ intent and also showed that Rogers knew Brooks well enough to have committed a prior robbery with him.
The 2nd DCA found that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. Peterson’s testimony was clear and convincing that the previous robbery occurred.” However, the 2nd DCA found “the two events were not similar enough to warrant admission of the testimony.” "[C]ollateral crime evidence is admissible as Williams rule evidence only if it is strikingly similar to the charged crime and the similarity is so unique as to constitute 'fingerprint' evidence." Fitzsimmons v. State, 935 So. 2d 125, 127-28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The 2nd DCA noted the robberies occurred at different places and also stated that the “circumstances are not so strikingly similar that they rise to the level of ‘fingerprint evidence.’” The “evidence of the prior robbery should not have been allowed” and this error is not harmless. The 2nd DCA reversed and remanded for new trial.
Assistant Attorney General Richard Fishkin represented the state.
[Rogers v. State, 05/11/12]
Opinion:
Fourth District Court of Appeal
Trial court erred denying suppression motion; common authority over premises “does not, in and of itself, permit a search of any personal property contained within the premises.”
Ward v. State, 4D10-5039. Opinion filed May 16, 2012.
Ward “entered a negotiated, no contest plea to charges of trafficking in MDMA (count III) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count IV), reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the drugs that formed the basis for the trafficking charge.” Ward argued “the evidence at the suppression hearing failed to establish that his mother had either the actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of the box found in the bedroom closet.”
At the suppression hearing the evidence established that Ward was arrested for another drug-related charge. The police went to his residence, which was his mother’s home. The police told the mother they suspected he had drugs in his room and the mother consented to the search of the premises. The mother told the police she had “regular access” to her son’s bedroom. Inside the bedroom closet, behind some jeans on the upper shelf, the police found a box and inside that box was a bag that contained ecstasy pills. It was noted that the closet had doors and contained men’s clothing.
- The Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches of an individual’s property does not apply when officers obtain consent either from the individual whose property is to be searched or from a third party who possesses “common authority” over the premises. Kelly v. State, 77 So. 3d 818, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)). Common authority over the premises, however, “does not, in and of itself, ‘permit search of any personal property contained within the premises.’” King v. State, 79 So. 3d 236, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (quoting Kelly, 77 So. 3d at 825). A third party cannot validly consent to a search of personal property belonging to another “‘unless there is evidence of both common authority over and mutual usage of the property.’” Id.
The 4th DCA stated that even assuming the mother’s “regular access” was sufficient to “substantiate the mother’s apparent authority to consent to a search of the appellant’s bedroom, such facts were insufficient to allow police to conclude the mother had actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of the box.” The 4th DCA found the trial court erred denying the suppression motion and reversed Ward’s conviction for Court III.
Assistant Attorney General Laura Fisher represented the state.
[Ward v. State, 05/16/12]
Opinion:
Fifth District Court of Appeal
Trial court erred; the right to testify is a fundamental right and that decision belongs to the defendant alone. Wilson v. State, 12 So. 3d 292, 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
Edwards v. State, 5D10-443. Opinion filed May 11, 2012.
Edwards appealed his judgment and sentence for first-degree premeditated murder and kidnapping arguing the trial court erred by: “(1) permitting Edwards' defense counsel to waive his right to testify at trial; (2) permitting defense counsel to present an insanity defense over Edwards' objection; (3) denying Edwards' motion to discharge his defense counsel as a result of a conflict of interest; and (4) denying Edwards' pro se request to remove shackles and jail attire before trial.”
The record revealed that “Edwards is a chronic paranoid schizophrenic who began experiencing delusions in his early twenties.” In 1999, his twin brother, Brent, became his guardian “and Edwards moved in with Brent and his girlfriend.” In 2003 Brent was arrested and taken to jail leaving Edwards with Karen Muskovitz, the brother’s girlfriend. Following his brother’s arrest, Edwards believed that Muskovitz “was a plant for the mafia and had visions of her hanging a cloth on the laundry line in the house as a signal to a hit squad to initiate an attack on him.” As Muskovitz was hanging clothes, Edwards strangled her to death as he believed this was confirmation to his visions. Edwards took another friend, Jerry Dunn, hostage with a pistol as he believed that Dunn was part of the conspiracy against him. The police intervened, Edwards was arrested, and he was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.” Throughout proceedings competency became an issue and in August 2004, Edwards was declared incompetent to proceed to trial. In 2005, Edwards was declared competent and the new “professional guardian,” who replaced his brother, hired private counsel to represent Edwards. At a hearing in 2008, Edwards informed the court “he did not wish to pursue the insanity defense” and if his attorney insisted on pursuing this, he would request a court-appointed attorney since he could no longer afford to hire an attorney. In 2009, the court held another hearing and found Edwards competent to stand trial and denied his motion to discharge counsel. Further, the trial court also noted that “as a result of the limited guardianship, Edwards did not have the ability to contract or terminate a contract with his attorney. “The trial court relied on Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), where the Supreme Court held that a defendant may be competent to stand trial but lack the capacity for self-representation.” The court found that Edwards’ “mental illness deprived him of the ability to analyze the facts and law so as to be able to make decisions concerning counsel.”
At trial, Edwards’ attorney advised the court that Edwards “will be tried in his jail clothes with shackles.” The court asked if Edwards agreed with that decision and counsel informed the court that “he did not know.” Edwards, when asked by the court, responded that he wanted to wear street clothes and even asked for a ruling on the issue. The court responded that it was a strategic decision made by his counsel and that “Edwards had been found to lack the capacity to make a decision regarding the matter.” So he was tried in his prison garb. Edwards was also denied the right to testify, again because his counsel made the strategic decision to not let him testify, even though Edwards disagreed with his counsel and wanted to testify.
In its lengthy analysis, the 5th DCA stated that before it addressed “Edwards’ appellate claims, we note that Edwards’ competency to stand trial in this case appears questionable at best.” The 5th DCA determined that the trial court’s reliance in Edwards was misplaced. In the instant case, “Edwards never requested to represent himself.” He wanted to discharge his lawyer “and have a court-appointed lawyer who would abide by his requests to not raise the insanity defense and permit him to tell his story to the jury.” The 5th DCA stated “assuming Edwards was competent to stand trial; we likewise assume that, under Edwards, he was competent to make decisions regarding his defense.”
The 5th DCA found that Rose was competent to make decision regarding his defense; that the decision to testify or not rested with Edwards; and the decision of whether or not to plead the insanity defense also rested with Edwards. The 5th DCA reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Assistant Attorney General Anthony Golden represented the state.
[Edwards v. State, 05/11/12]
Opinion:
Error to deny bond; State did not file motion for pretrial detention.
Jenkins v. State, 5D12-1678. Opinion filed May 9, 2012.
Jenkins, “charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, false imprisonment with a weapon, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and battery (domestic violence),” was denied bond following a hearing. Jenkins filed a petition for Habeas Corpus arguing bond cannot be denied because “the State did not file a motion for pretrial detention pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.132.”
The State agreed a new hearing is required and requested “that on remand it be given an opportunity to file a motion for pretrial detention pursuant to the rule.”
The 5th DCA granted the petition, remanded with directions for the court to conduct a pretrial release hearing and stated that the “decision is without prejudice for the State to file a motion for pretrial detention, should it choose to do so.”
Assistant Attorney General Rebecca Rock McGuigan represented the state.
[Jenkins v. State, 05/09/12]
Opinion: